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Abstract: How does science relate to aesthetics? This question usually reads as a
question concerning scientific contribution to aesthetics. Philosophers are most-
ly skeptical about the application of scientific results in their domain, wheras
psychologists and, in recent years, neuroscientists are optimistic. In the thesis, I
argue that both of these positions, in their extreme versions, impede the mutual
enrichment of science and aesthetics. The starting-point of the thesis is George
Dickie’s radical claim that no scientific information has ever been relevant for
aesthetics. The claim, I argue, is firmly embedded in the aftermath of logical
positivism: it is related to the e↵ort to “rescue” aesthetics from progressive eli-
mination. As a consequence, most of analytic aesthetics discourse has ignored
psychologically informed conception of aesthetic judgement, including some fine
distinctions that such a conception enables, e.g. the di↵erence between judgements
about pleasure and aesthetic judgements. The distinctions are further elaborated
and, in the last part of the thesis, the results of this elaboration are applied to
some of recent contributions to aesthetics in experimental psychology and neuro-
aesthetics. I o↵er an alternative interpretation of results of the experiments the
theories are based on.
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